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I. INTRODUCTION 
Arbitration is predicated on a consensual agreement between 
disputing parties that ostensibly provides for a neutral, private and 
efficient forum to resolve their disputes. The process is largely 
prescribed in the agreement by the parties and the final and binding 
award that emerges is enforceable in all countries that are parties to the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards 1958, commonly known as the New York Convention,1 to 
which 159 states have to date subscribed.2 In most cases the arbitration 
will be administered by an arbitral institution, while in the absence of 
a pre-existing arbitration agreement, it will be ad hoc. The agreement 
will cover issues such as the substantive choice of law and the 
procedural rules that will apply, and the place and language of the 
arbitration. International commercial arbitration has enjoyed 
increasing popularity3 as an alternative to litigation in court, with high 
standards expected by parties of the appointed arbitrators in managing 
a fair process and ensuring a just outcome. Central to the concepts of 
fairness and justice are neutrality, independence and impartiality, 
themes that are often closely associated with each other in arbitral 
proceedings and often lack specific guidance as to their meaning. This 
article evaluates these concepts and discusses how adherence to them 
is largely dependent upon the appointed arbitrators.4 Part II discusses 
the close association between the concepts and the distinctions 
between them. Parts III and IV assess the legislative and judicial 
approaches respectively to dealing with the concepts, with a particular 
focus on the contrasting approaches adopted in England and the 
                                                 
 1 See GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 99–105 
(2nd ed. 2014). 
 2 UNCITRAL, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (1958) 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_st
atus.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2018). 
 3 See TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 341 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 
2005); Mary Jude V. Cantorias, Party-Appointed Arbitrator Ethics and Ethos – Cross-
Cultural Differences and How They Affect Arbitrator Behaviour in Rendering Arbitral Awards, 
12 ARELLANO L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 53 (2014). 
 4 See GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 1–
2 (2nd ed. 2016). 
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United States of America. Part V discusses the impact of human rights 
on the development of standards. Part VI discusses the absence of 
legislative or regulatory unanimity in this area, while part VII proposes 
possible reforms to ensure greater international cohesion and 
consistency. The final part draws the various parts together into a 
reflective conclusion. 
II. CLOSELY ASSOCIATED DISTINCT CONCEPTS 
Although impartiality, independence and neutrality are often 
understood as the same thing under a narrow construct by some 
commentators, the neutrality of an arbitrator goes much further than 
the other two concepts.5 Impartiality and independence are often used 
synonymously to reflect the unbiased quality that arbitrators are 
expected to possess. While often used interchangeably,6 they are 
conceptually different albeit linked.7 Impartiality is assessed 
subjectively while independence adopts an objective test.8 Similar to 
independence, neutrality reflects an objective status, and requires that 
the arbitrator is intermediate and equidistant in thought and action 
throughout the arbitral process.9 Conversely, impartiality is subjective 
and abstract in nature and requires an investigation to determine 
evidence of bias,10 which can be very difficult to establish in practice, 
hence the need to look for external behaviour that establishes the 
                                                 
 5 See generally Giorgio Bernini, Cultural Neutrality: A Prerequisite to Arbitral 
Justice, 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 39 (1989); Pierre Lalive, On the Neutrality of the Arbitrator 
and of the Place of Arbitration, in RECUEIL DE TRAVAUX SUISSES SUR L’ARBITRAGE 
INTERNATIONAL 24 (1984). 
 6 See MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 140–41 (3rd ed. 2017). 
 7 See NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, REDFERN AND 
HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 255 (6th ed. 2015). 
 8 Leon Trakman, The Impartiality and Independence of Arbitrators Reconsidered, 10 
INT’L ARB. L. REV. 999, 1007–08 (2007). 
 9 Bernini, supra note 5, at 39. See also BORN, supra note 4, at 8. 
 10 Rom K.L. Chung, Conceptual Framework of Arbitrators’ Impartiality and 
Independence, 80 ARB. 2, 3–4 (2014). See generally Shivani Singhal, Independence and 
Impartiality of Arbitrators, 11 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 124 (2008). 
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arbitrator’s state of mind.11 A lack of neutrality does not automatically 
result in partiality, but no arbitrator may be deemed neutral if he or she 
is behaving partially.12 
Neutrality in the context of international arbitration has two 
aspects.13 As noted above, the first is that parties choose arbitration as 
it offers a neutral forum, with neither party having the advantage of 
their domestic court.14 The second relates to the nationality of the 
arbitrator. In situations where the parties appoint a sole arbitrator, it is 
suggested that the nationality of the appointed individual be 
independent of the nationalities of the appointing parties. This 
approach should also be followed when party-appointed arbitrators 
appoint a presiding arbitrator. With regard to the neutrality of party-
appointed arbitrators,15 it has been suggested that a party-appointed 
arbitrator may be influenced by the particular appointing party’s 
desired outcome.16 Hence, the key motivation for this approach 
                                                 
 11 See Hong-Lin Yu & Laurence Shore, Independence, Impartiality and Immunity 
of Arbitrators - US and English perspectives, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q 935, 936 (2003). See 
generally Rom K.L. Chung, The Rules of Natural Justice in Arbitration, 77 ARB. 172 (2011). 
 12 Bernini, supra note 5, at 39–40. 
 13 Susan D. Franck, The Role of International Arbitrators, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 499, 501 (2006). 
 14 MOSES, supra note 6, at 1. 
 15 See David J. McLean & Sean-Patrick Wilson, Is Three a Crowd? Neutrality, 
Partiality and Partisanship in the Context of Tripartite Arbitrations, 9 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. 
L.J. 167, 168–69 (2008). See also Laurens J.E. Timmer, The Quality, Independence and 
Impartiality of the Arbitrator in International Commercial Arbitration, 78 ARB. 348, 350–51 
(2012). 
 16 Hans Smit, Quo Vadis Arbitration? Sixty Years of Arbitration Practice, by Pieter 
Sanders, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 429, 429 (2000). The logic for party appointed 
arbitrators ostensibly developed in part, in order that the appointed arbitrator could 
explain the party’s position to the other arbitrators to combat the risk that the other 
arbitrators could not grasp the party’s position due to national, cultural, legal and 
language differences. See M. Scott Donahey, The Independence and Neutrality of 
Arbitrators, 9 J. INT’L ARB. 31, 39 (1992). Balancing the tensions inherent in the party-
appointed arbitrator regime has been a challenge for some time, see Doak Bishop & 
Lucy Reed, Practical Guidelines for Interviewing, Selecting and Challenging Party-Appointed 
Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration, 14 ARB. INT’L 395 (1998). For an 
interesting discussion on, and persuasive arguments against the unilateral 
appointment of arbitrators, see Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute 
Resolution, Inaugural Lecture as Holder of the Michael R. Klein Distinguished 
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regarding “national neutrality,” perceived as a vital factor for the 
effective functioning of the arbitral process,17 is to avoid actual or 
perceived bias.18 
Neutrality fundamentally relates to the arbitrator’s 
predisposition towards a party personally or to the party’s position,19 
and as noted, this predisposition has generally been accepted as 
resulting from the nationality and culture the arbitrator and one of the 
parties share.20 An international arbitrator should be neutral regarding 
the nationalities, the political systems and the legal systems of both 
parties, and effectively possess a high degree of “international 
mindedness.”21 Hence the link between neutrality and nationality is 
predicated on the assumption that an arbitrator who shares the same 
nationality, culture and language as one of the parties will be 
susceptible or sympathetic to that party and to their position in the 
arbitration, with obvious concerns for both the fairness of the process 
and ultimate award,22 as the acceptability of the award will be 
dependent on the quality, skills and credibility of the arbitrators who 
deliver it. While this is an assumption and may not be the practice in 
most cases, the concerns with regard to bias, or the perception of bias, 
have been sufficient such that the general practice is to select sole 
arbitrators and presiding arbitrators that possess nationalities that are 
different from the nationalities of the parties to the arbitration.23 
                                                 
Scholar Chair, (Apr. 29, 2010), https://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/0/12773749999020/paulsson_moral_hazard.pdf. 
 17 Lalive, supra note 5, at 23–25. 
 18 See William W. Park, Neutrality, Predictability and Economic Co-operation, 12 J. 
INT’L ARB. 99, 103 (1995). 
 19 BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 7, at 254. 
 20 Ilhyung Lee, Practice and Predicament: The Nationality of The International 
Arbitrator (With Survey Results), 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 603, 613 (2007). 
 21 See Park, supra note 18, at 103–05; LCIA Court Decision on the Challenge 
to Mr Judd L Kessler in the Arbitration of National Grid Plc v The Republic of Argentina, 
LCIA Case No. UN 7949 (2005) (holding that the “concept of neutrality involves an 
arbitrator taking a certain distance in relation to his legal, political and religious 
culture”). 
 22 Donahey, supra note 16, at 32. 
 23 BORN, supra note 4, at 8. 
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However, others contend that a common outlook associating 
neutrality with nationality should not be generalised, as any arbitrator 
who is “neutral,” regardless of nationality, should be sufficiently 
competent to use their judgment and determine the arbitration in 
favour of the party that makes the better case.24 Regardless of such 
contentions, neutrality is clearly linked to nationality, and some 
contend that independence, impartiality and neutrality are all 
synonymous concepts.25 However, there are clearly differences as 
neutrality relates more to the perception of bias rather than actual bias, 
and is consequently different from impartiality that relates to actual 
bias, and adopts a subjective test.26 
The requirement that an arbitrator’s nationality be different 
from that of the parties27 is reflected in various international arbitration 
rules including the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Arbitration Rules (“UNCITRAL 
Rules”),28 the American Arbitration Association International 
Arbitration Rules (“AAA Rules”),29 the London Court of International 
                                                 
 24 BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 7, at 250. 
 25 Murray L. Smith, Impartiality of the party-appointed arbitrator, 58 ARB. 30, 31–
32 (1992). See also Lalive, supra note 5, at 24. 
 26 Indeed, it is interesting that the earlier versions of the International 
Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules referred only to independence, for 
example, ICC Arbitration Rules, art. 7.1 (1998), impartiality was not mentioned as it 
was deemed difficult to define, in light of its subjective status. See generally Bruno 
Manzanares Bastida, The Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators in International 
Commercial Arbitration, 6 REVISTA E-MERCATORIA 1 (2007); Stephen Bond, The 
Selection of ICC Arbitrators and the Requirement of Independence, 4 ARB. INT’L 300 (1988). 
While an explicit impartiality requirement was absent, arbitrators were still required 
to be impartial. See Stephen Bond, The International Arbitrator: From the Perspective of the 
ICC International Court of Arbitration, 12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 12 (1991). The most 
recent version of the ICC Rules published in 2017, includes the standards of 
impartiality and independence that are explicitly required in Article 11.1. However, 
the rules do not clarify the meaning of the terms. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 
ARBITRATION RULES, art. 11.1 (2017). 
 27 Donahey, supra note 16, at 32. 
 28 G.A. Res. 68/109, at 6.7, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Dec. 16, 2013) 
[hereinafter ‘UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules”]. 
 29 AM, ARBITRATION ASS’N, INT’L ARBITRATION RULES art. 12.4 
(2014) [hereinafter “AAA ARBITRATION RULES”]. 
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Arbitration Rules (“LCIA Rules”),30 the International Chamber of 
Commerce Arbitration Rules (“ICC Rules”)31 and the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation Arbitration Rules (“WIPO” 
Rules).32 The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration (the “Model Law”), discussed further below, takes a 
somewhat different approach, stating that nationality cannot be a 
reason to preclude an arbitrator in the absence of an agreement to the 
contrary by the parties.33 However, this general approach is tempered 
in the context where there is a sole or presiding arbitrator, and the 
Model Law requires that nationality should be considered in such 
circumstances.34 
Impartiality requires that an arbitrator is free from bias due to 
preconceived notions regarding the dispute, or any other reason that 
may result in favouring one party over the other.35 As noted above, 
impartiality relates to the arbitrator’s state of mind and actual bias. 
Proving actual bias requires a factual, subjective approach. In light of 
its abstract nature, measuring impartiality is quite difficult. Courts 
consequently review the facts and circumstances in which the 
arbitrator exercised his or her functions before inferring whether there 
was bias, and the courts have consequently relied upon a finding of 
apparent bias rather than actual bias in determining arbitrator 
impartiality.36 Hence, while impartiality relates to the state of mind of 
the arbitrator that is demonstrated through conduct, partiality is 
displayed through showing preference to one of the parties usually 
leading to the detriment of the other. Albeit a subjective concept, 
impartiality must be demonstrated through some external behaviour 
that establishes the arbitrator’s state or frame of mind, such as a 
                                                 
 30 LONDON COURT OF INT’L ARBITRATION, ARBITRATION 
RULES art. 6 (2014) [hereinafter “LCIA ARBITRATION RULES”]. 
 31 INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION RULES, art. 
13.5 (2017) [hereinafter “ICC ARBITRATION RULES”]. 
 32 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., ARBITRATION RULES 
art. 20 (2014) [hereinafter “WIPO ARBITRATION RULES”]. 
 33 MODEL LAW ON INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION art. 11.1 
(1985) (U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, amended 2006) [hereinafter 
“UNCITRAL Model Law”]. 
 34 Id. at art. 11.5. 
 35 MOSES, supra note 6, at 141. 
 36 Trakman, supra note 8, at 1007. 
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professional or personal relationship with one of the parties that may 
reasonably lead to a conclusion that an arbitrator was partial. Where 
no such relationship exists, partiality may be demonstrated through the 
arbitrator’s conduct.37 
Independence reflects the lack of a pre-existing relationship 
between the arbitrator and the parties—whether financial, personal or 
otherwise.38 An arbitrator’s independence essentially “emanates from 
his [or her] judicial function.’”39 Independence is diminished 
depending upon the closeness of the relationship. An objective test is 
employed to make this determination as it has nothing to do with the 
state of mind of the arbitrator. It is usually relatively easy to determine 
closeness in certain situations, such as when a business or financial 
relationship exists. The independence requirement must be discharged 
before the arbitral process can continue, and in the event that the 
objective test is not satisfied, bias will be assumed and the arbitrator 
will be removed. When the appearance of bias is sufficient, the 
presence of actual bias is not required, and circumstances may give rise 
to a party’s concern about a lack of independence subsequently raising 
doubts about the arbitrator’s impartiality.40 Hence, in practice, 
“national courts and arbitral institutions [usually] base their decisions 
about impartiality entirely on ‘appearances’ and, in at least some 
significant number of cases, will disqualify presumptively unbiased 
arbitrators merely because the apparent risk (that is, the appearance) 
of actual bias is unacceptably great.”41 
                                                 
 37 Id. at 1006–08. In Re The Owners of the Steamship “Catalina” and Others 
and The Owners of the Motor Vessel “Norma” [1938] 61 Llyod’s Rep. 360 at 364 
(Eng.), for example, the arbitrator’s comment that Portuguese people were liars 
during the process was a sufficient basis to order the removal of the arbitrator. 
 38 BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 7, at 255. 
 39 BORN, supra note 1, at 1762 (quoting “Judgment of 2 June 1989, Société 
Gemanco v. Société Arabe des engrais phosphates et azotes, 1991 Rev. arb. 87, 87 
(Paris Cour d’appel)”). 
 40 Donahey, supra note 16, at 31. 
 41 BORN, supra note 1, at 1786. Historically, a lack of neutrality or indeed the 
appearance of impartiality were not requirements in some countries. In medieval 
Iceland, for example, arbitrators were neither required nor expected “to be neutral 
or impartial so long as they acted in moderation and remained effective.” Moreover, 
eleventh century France saw parties selecting “relatives, friends or business 
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In Locabail (UK) Ltd v. Bayfield Properties Ltd, the English Court 
of Appeal provided clear guidance on possible circumstances where a 
lack of independence by an arbitrator vis a vis one of the parties cannot 
be raised, including “previous political associations,” previous 
memberships of “social or sporting or charitable bodies,” masonic 
associations, or circumstances where the acting arbitrator previously 
received instructions “to act for or against any party, solicitor or 
advocate” involved in an arbitration, or “membership of the same 
Inn[s of Court], circuit, local Law Society or [barristers’] 
chambers. . . .”42 Conversely, a real danger of bias could arise where 
there is a personal friendship, close acquaintance or animosity between 
the arbitrator and anyone involved in the arbitration, as the credibility 
of the arbitrator is centrally significant in making the award.43 The 
English courts have stressed that most arbitrators have significant 
experience and are highly knowledgeable, and in light of the limited 
pool of arbitrators,44 it is highly likely that arbitrators will have had 
dealings either with parties or with one another previously.45 
                                                 
associates” to arbitrate disputes involving property. See Olga K. Byrne, A New Code 
of Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators: The Neutrality of Party-Appointed Arbitrators on a 
Tripartite Panel, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1815, 1820 (2003). 
 42 Locabail (UK) Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd. [2000] QB 451 at [480] 
para. 25 (Eng.). 
 43 Id. The judgment referred to judges, but it is also applicable to arbitrators. 
See generally Christopher Koch, Standards and Procedures for Disqualifying Arbitrators, 20 
J. INT’L ARB. 325 (2003). 
 44 This has given rise to the issue of “Repeat Players,” where the same party 
or law firm appoints the same arbitrator numerous times. See William W. Park, 
Rectitude in International Arbitration, 27 ARB. INT’L 473, 491–92 (2011). 
 45 For example, in Rustal Trading Ltd. v. Gill & Duffus SA [2000] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 14 at [237] (QBD), one of the arbitrators had previously been involved in an 
arbitration with a consultant of the plaintiff. Moore-Bick, J., held that the previous 
arbitration occurred more than two years previously and could not be described as 
recent, and there was nothing to indicate that the arbitrator maintained any animosity 
towards the consultant resulting from it. For an interesting discussion of this issue in 
the context of investment treaty arbitration, and proposals to resolve the issues 
discussed, see generally Carly Coleman, How International is International Investment 
Dispute Resolution? Exploring Party Incentives to Expand ICSID Arbitrator Demographics, 26 
TRANSNAT’L L & CONTEMP. PROBS. 121 (2016). 
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It has been suggested that independence and impartiality 
describe the same thing, but in different ways.46 The concepts of 
impartiality and independence have also been integrated into the rules 
of international arbitral institutions as an obligation placed upon 
arbitrators to act with fairness and without bias. The UNCITRAL 
Rules,47 the AAA Rules,48 the LCIA Rules49 and the WIPO Rules50 
impose the requirement on arbitrators to act fairly and without bias 
during the proceedings. As noted, the ICC Rules also include 
impartiality and independence requirements.51 
III. LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES 
UNCITRAL developed the Model Law to assist states in 
reforming and modernizing their laws on arbitral procedure to take 
into account the particular features and needs of international 
commercial arbitration.52 It is representative of an arbitrator’s 
obligations of independence and impartiality in contemporary 
arbitration legislation,53 and has acted as a template for the adoption 
of domestic arbitration statutes in eighty states.54 The Model Law 
provides that if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts 
                                                 
 46 Koch, supra note 43, at 331. See also Park, supra note 44, at 477–79. For an 
interesting discussion on impartiality generally, and how it is a virtue, albeit a limited 
one in the author’s view, see generally William Lucy, The Possibility of Impartiality, 25 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 3 (2005). 
 47 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 33, at art. 12; UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, supra note 28, at art. 12. 
 48 AAA ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 29, at art. 13.1. 
 49 LCIA ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 30, at art. 10.1(iii). 
 50 WIPO ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 32, at art. 37. 
 51 ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 31, at art. 11.1. See sources cited 
supra note 26. For an interesting discussion on the rights of arbitrators within the 
parameters of the ethical issues facing arbitrators from the perspective of a seasoned 
US arbitrator, see generally James H. Carter, Rights and Obligations of the Arbitrator 63 
ARB. 170 (1997). 
 52 See generally UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 33. 
 53 BORN, supra note 1, at 1764. 
 54 This equates to 111 jurisdictions to date. See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with amendments as adopted in 2006, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitr
ation_status.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2018). 
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regarding the impartiality or independence of an arbitrator, then this is 
a basis upon which he or she may be challenged.55 The “justifiable 
doubts” standard is an objective one, and does not require evidence of 
certainty or likelihood of partiality or dependence.56 
While many jurisdictions have adopted a similar approach to 
the Model Law in their domestic law, England is an exception. The 
English Arbitration Act 1996 does not require independence or that 
arbitrators disclose their interests. Section 24(1)(a) provides that one 
of the grounds on which an arbitrator can be removed relates to where 
“circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his 
impartiality.”57 Additionally, Section 33(1)(a) relating to the general 
duty of the arbitral body, imposes the requirement that it “act fairly 
and impartially as between the parties.”58 This appears to be based on 
the understanding that because arbitration is consensual, a lack of 
independence is not significant unless it results in justifiable doubts 
about the impartiality of the arbitrator.59 The English Court of Appeal 
also supported this view in Stretford v. Football Association Ltd,60 where it 
remarked, “lack of independence is only relevant if it gives rise to 
                                                 
 55 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 33, at art. 12.2. India incorporated 
the Model Law in 2015 and Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 
imposes this requirement of disclosure. Shakti Bhog Food Ltd v. Kola Shipping Ltd and 
Anr OMP 194 of 2009, High Court of Delhi, held a lack of independence and 
impartiality by an arbitrator where he failed to disclose a previous connection with 
one of the parties was “likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence 
and impartiality.” See generally the Australian case of Gascor v Elliot [1997] 1 VR 332, 
where the Victoria Court of Appeals also applied a similar principle. See also 
Dominique Hascher, Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
789, 792–806 (2012) for a discussion of this issue. 
 56 BORN, supra note 1, at 1764. This objective test is followed in numerous 
arbitral institutional rules, such as the ICC Rules. 
 57 Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 24(1)(a). 
 58 Id. at § 33(1)(a). 
 59 UK DEP’T ADVISORY COMM. ON ARBITRATION LAW, REPORT ON THE 
ARBITRATION BILL 102–04 (1996). See also Chung, supra note 10, at 2. An action by 
a party relating to “justifiable doubts” regarding impartiality under Section 24(1)(a), 
would be focused on the process while an action by a party that the arbitrator failed 
to “act fairly and impartiality as between the parties” under Section 33(1)(a) would 
be focused on the award. There is a more stringent standard to set aside the award 
than to remove the arbitrator. 
 60 [2007] EWCA (Civ) 238 [39], [2007] All ER (Comm.) [1] (Eng.). 
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[justifiable] doubts, in which case the arbitrator can be removed for 
lack of impartiality.”61 Another reason that motivated the explicit 
exclusion of the term “independence” is that if it was included, it could 
lead to endless challenges, where almost any remote connection 
between an arbitrator and a party could be furnished as a basis to 
challenge the independence of the arbitrator, and could consequently 
significantly diminish the availability of experts who could act as 
arbitrators.62 
Section 10(a)(2) of the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act provides 
that “evident partiality” by the arbitrator is one basis upon which an 
arbitral award may be set aside.63 This provision has been characterised 
as less direct and less effective compared to most other developed 
jurisdictions, as it does not provide for interlocutory challenges or the 
removal of arbitrators and does not directly address the standards of 
impartiality and independence required of arbitrators, and only deals 
with an arbitrator’s impartiality in the context of vacating an award.64 
The test to determine justifiable doubts regarding the 
arbitrator’s impartiality, discussed further below, is to assess whether 
there is a real likelihood that the arbitrator was biased, taking into 
account the circumstances adduced by the party challenging the 
impartiality of the arbitrator and the relevant legal traditions and 
cultures.65 As noted above, this concern is also reflected in the Model 
                                                 
 61 Id. The court referred specifically to the rationale of the UK DEP’T 
ADVISORY COMM. ON ARBITRATION LAW, REPORT ON THE ARBITRATION BILL 101 
(1996). 
 62 UK DEP’T ADVISORY COMM. ON ARBITRATION LAW, REPORT ON THE 
ARBITRATION BILL 102–04. 
 63 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2). 
 64 BORN, supra note 1, at 1765. 
 65 On the influence of culture generally in international arbitration, see 
generally Rosabel E. Goodman-Everard, Cultural Diversity in International Arbitration-
A Challenge for Decision-Makers and Decision-Making 7 ARB. INT’L 155 (1991); Lara M. 
Pair, Cross Cultural Arbitration: Do the Differences between Cultures still influence International 
Commercial Arbitration Despite Harmonisation? 9 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 57 (2002); 
William K. Slate II, Paying Attention to Culture in International Commercial Arbitration 59 
DISP. RES. J. 96 (2004). See also Cantorias, supra note 3, at 53–72, for an interesting 
comparative analysis of Asian and Western models of arbitration, and how this 
affects arbitrator behavior. 
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Law and numerous arbitration rules provide that arbitrators must 
disclose any circumstances that could “give rise to justifiable doubts” 
regarding their “impartiality or independence,”66 and this obligation 
begins before they are appointed and remains a continuing one 
throughout the process.67 
IV. JUDICIAL APPROACHES 
The English courts have adopted divergent standards at 
various stages “ranging from a ‘reasonable suspicion’68 . . . to a ‘real 
danger’ or ‘real possibility’ of bias,”69 to automatic disqualification for 
pecuniary interest,70 often failing to explain the differences between 
the different categorizations.71 The current standard to challenge an 
arbitrator in England is based on whether a “fair-minded and informed 
observer” would conclude that there was a “real possibility” that the 
arbitral tribunal was not impartial.72 The reasonable appearance of bias, 
rather than evidence of actual bias, is sufficient.73 Other common law 
jurisdictions, such as Australia and South Africa have adopted less 
                                                 
 66 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 33, art. 12.1. 
 67 See generally MOSES, supra note 6, at 141. See also BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, 
supra note 7, at 255. 
 68 R v. Mulvihill [1990] 1 All ER 436, 441. See also BORN, supra note 1, at 
1771, for a discussion of this issue. 
 69 BORN, supra note 1, at 1771; AT&T Corporation v. Saudi Cable Co. [2000] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep. 127, 134–35. 
 70 R v. Gough [1993] 2 All ER 724 (HL) at 729, 732. See also BORN, supra 
note 1, at 1771, for a discussion of this issue. 
 71 See BORN, supra note 1, at 1770–71, for a discussion of this issue and the 
related caselaw. 
 72 Porter v. Magill [2001] UKHL 67 [103], [2002] 1 All ER 465 at 507 [103]. 
 73 ASM Shipping Ltd. v. TTMI Ltd. [2005] EWHC (Comm) 2238 [39], 
[2006] All ER (Comm) 122 at 130 [9]. This was preceded by the House of Lord’s 
decisions in Lawal v. Northern Spirit Ltd. [2003] UKHL 35 [19], [2004] 1 All ER 187 
at 195 [19], where it also applied the test of “a real possibility of unconscious bias”, 
and Porter v. Magill [2001] UKHL 67 [103], [2002] 1 All ER 465 at 507 [103], where 
it stated the test was whether a “fair-minded and informed observer, having 
considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal 
was biased”. French courts have adopted a similar standard requiring “definite risk 
of bias”. See BORN, supra note 1, at 1771–73, for a discussion of this issue and the 
related case law. 
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demanding standards and consider whether there is a “reasonable 
suspicion” or “apprehension” of bias.74 
The leading case in the U.S. dealing with this issue is 
Commonwealth Coatings Corporation v. Continental Casualty Company,75 in 
which the Supreme Court set aside an award based on the principle of 
“evident partiality” as the presiding arbitrator failed to disclose a four 
to five-year consulting relationship with a party to the arbitration. 
However, the Court failed to provide a clear standard of impartiality 
and independence.76 Justice Black, with whom three other Justices 
joined, said, “[W]e should . . . be even more scrupulous to safeguard 
the impartiality of arbitrators than judges, since the former have 
completely free rein to decide the law as well as the facts and are not 
subject to appellate review.”77 Conversely, Justice White, with whom 
one other Justice concurred, agreed with the result but made 
comments that reflected a very different standard of impartiality: “[t]he 
Court does not decide today that arbitrators are to be held to the 
standards of judicial decorum . . . of any judge[].”78 The remaining 
three Justices dissented. The fractured Supreme Court decision has led 
to confusion in light of the diverging opinions of Justice Black and 
Justice White, who agreed on little other than the result.79 It has led to 
varied and inconsistent lower court decisions. Some courts have 
followed Justice Black’s analysis, that they must be more scrupulous to 
safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than judges, resulting in 
domestic awards being vacated based on an appearance of bias or a 
                                                 
 74 See the decision of the Australian High Court in R v Watson (1976) 136 
CLR 248, [40] and the decision of the Supreme Court of South Africa (Appellate 
Division), in BTR Indus. South Africa (Pty) Ltd. v. Metal & Allied Workers’ Union [1992] 
(3) SA 673 at [51]. 
 75 393 U.S. 145, 147–48 (1968). 
 76 See McLean & Wilson, supra note 15, at 177. 
 77 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 
(1968). See also BORN, supra note 1, at 1767. 
 78 Commonwealth, 393 U.S. at 150 (White, J., concurring). See also BORN, supra 
note 1, at 1767–68. 
 79 See Catherine Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional 
Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 53, 55–56 (2005). 
2019 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 7:1 
102 
reasonable impression of bias or partiality.80 Other courts have 
followed Justice White’s analysis, that arbitrators are not necessarily to 
be held to the same standards as judges, and have vacated awards only 
where “a reasonable person . . . ‘would have to conclude’ that an 
arbitrator was partial to one side.”81 Despite this uncertainty, the 
majority view among U.S. courts appears to be that an arbitral award 
can be vacated based only on “evident partiality,”82 such that an 
objective observer would be compelled to conclude that an arbitrator 
was biased or partial. Hence, an “impression” of partiality or “serious 
doubts” about impartiality are not sufficient.83 
While the courts in various jurisdictions have adopted a 
divergent approach as discussed above, “the trend in recent years has 
. . . been a move away from equating or linking standards of 
impartiality of international arbitrators to those of national court 
judges.”84 This is based on the premise that arbitration and litigation 
can be distinguished in important ways, and an understanding that 
experts in particular industries, disciplines and legal communities have 
contacts and relationships with the parties and their counsel, and that 
disqualifying experienced individuals based on such factors is not 
required to preserve impartiality and would deprive the parties of 
competent experienced specialists to decide on their disputes. 
However, this approach must be balanced against the fact that 
arbitrators are not subject to appellate review, strict disclosure 
obligations or judicial institutional controls, and such contentions are 
used to argue that arbitrators should be held to the same standard as 
                                                 
 80 See, e.g., Dealer Computer Services Inc. v. Michael Motor Co., 485 F. App’x. 724, 
727–28 (5th Cir. 2012) that applied the “reasonable impression of bias” standard 
(referred to in BORN, supra note 1, at 1768). 
 81 See, e.g., NGX Network Asia v. PAC Pac. Group Int’l, Inc., 511 F. App’x 86, 
88 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve 
Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2007) (referred to in BORN, supra note 1, at 
1769). 
 82 Commonwealth, 393 U.S. at 147. 
 83 See BORN, supra note 1, at 1770 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) U.S. LAW 
OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 4–20 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative 
Draft No. 2, 2012)). 
 84 Id. at 1787. 
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judges.85 Outside the U.S., some national statutes have consequently 
explicitly stated that arbitrators are to be held to the same standards of 
impartiality and independence as domestic court judges.86 The English 
Court of Appeal for example, held that the same standards of 
impartiality that apply to judges should apply to arbitrators, but 
appeared to soften this position when it remarked, consistent with the 
international trend, “the courts are responsible for the provision of 
public justice. If there are two standards I would expect a lower 
threshold [for bias] to apply to courts of law than applies to a private 
tribunal whose ‘judges’ are selected by the parties.”87 
V. IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
It has long been established that arbitration agreements do not 
breach constitutional or human rights relating to the right of access to 
court as parties can waive their rights by entering into arbitration 
agreements.88 The advent of the Human Rights Act 1998 gave effect 
to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Article 6 of 
the ECHR includes the guarantee of “a fair and public hearing within 
a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established 
                                                 
 85 See generally Susan D. Franck, The Role of International Arbitrators, 12 ILSA J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 499 (2006). 
 86 The Articles 1456 and 1506(2) of the French Code of Civil Procedure 
applies domestic judicial independence standards to arbitrators sitting in France. See 
BORN, supra note 1, at 1789 (citing CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVIL [C.P.C.] [CIVIL 
PROCEDURE CODE] art. 1456, 1506(2) (fr.)). 
 87 See BORN, supra note 1, at 1788–89 (citing AT&T Corp. v. Saudi Cable Co. 
[2000] EWCA (Civ) 154 [40], [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127 [135] (Eng.). 
 88 Scott v. Avery and others (1856) All ER 1,1. Article 5 of the Model Law 
also provides that “in matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except 
where so provided in this Law”. Waiver of one’s right of access to court was also 
explicitly acknowledged by the European Court of Human Rights in Deweer v. Belgium, 
2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, 460–61, where it stated “civil matters, notable in the shape of 
arbitration clauses in contracts . . . [t]he waiver, which has undeniable advantages for 
the individual concerned as well as for the administration of justice, does not in 
principle offend against the Convention”. However, the waiver must be voluntary. 
See David Altaras, Arbitration in England and Wales and the European Convention on Human 
Rights: Should Arbitrators be Frightened?, 73 ARB. 262, 265–66 (2007). 
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by law.”89 Consequently, UK courts have considered Strasbourg 
jurisprudence when determining the impartiality and independence of 
arbitral tribunals.90 The mandatory provisions of the Arbitration Act 
1996 reflect Article 6 rights, such as Section 1 of the Arbitration Act 
1996, which prescribes that the overarching object of the process is 
“to obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal 
without unnecessary delay or expense.”91 
As noted above, Section 24 of the Act empowers the court to 
remove arbitrators on grounds that include justifiable doubts as to 
their impartiality, incapacity, and refusal or failure to properly conduct 
the proceedings, provided that “substantial injustice has been or will 
be caused to” a party.92 Also as noted above, Section 33 expressly 
requires the tribunal to act fairly and impartially between the parties. 
Challenges to an award based on a lack of substantive jurisdiction or 
serious irregularity are provided for in Sections 67 and 68 of the Act, 
respectively.93 Section 68(2) defines “serious irregularity” as one or 
more of the specified kinds of irregularity that the court considers will 
“cause substantial injustice to the applicant” and this includes failure 
of the tribunal to comply with Section 33 of the Act discussed above.94 
The Court of Appeal has also helpfully provided the following: 
These provisions of the 1996 Act are important in the 
context of Article 6 of the Convention because they 
provide for a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal. 
Moreover, the mandatory provisions ensure that the 
High Court has power to put right any want of 
impartiality or procedural fairness, so that the only 
provisions of Article 6 which could arguably be said 
                                                 
 89 Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, art. 6 para. 
1. 
 90 For example, the judgment in Porter v. Magill, [2001] UKHL 67 [84] [2002] 
2 AC 357 (appeal taken from Eng.), discussed at supra note 73, was influenced by the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Similarly, arbitrators are 
under an obligation to construe UK domestic legislation in a way that is compatible 
with ECHR Rights. See Altaras, supra note 88, at 263. 
 91 Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 1(a) (Eng.). 
 92 Id. at § 24(1). 
 93 Id. at §§ 67–68. 
 94 Id. at § 68(2)(a). 
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not formally to be met by the Act are the requirements 
that the hearing be in public, that the members of the 
tribunal be independent, that the tribunal be 
established by law and that the judgment be 
pronounced publicly.95 
The court also held: 
In our judgment the provisions of English law 
contained in the 1996 Act amply satisfy the principles 
in the Strasbourg cases. . . . In particular the mandatory 
provisions require the arbitrators to be impartial and to 
act fairly and impartially as between the parties. They 
allow for the removal of an arbitrator, for example, if 
there are justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or if 
there is a refusal or failure properly to conduct the 
proceedings. The court has power to set aside the 
award on the grounds of lack of substantive 
jurisdiction or serious irregularity, which includes a 
failure to act fairly and impartially between the parties. 
Moreover Section 69 of the 1996 Act . . . affords 
greater access to the court by way of appeal than is 
permitted in many countries and, indeed, by many 
standard forms of arbitration such as arbitration under 
the ICC Rules.96 
The approach adopted in England may be contrasted with the 
approach on the other side of the Atlantic. In the U.S., the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution guarantee “due process 
of law,”97 which includes impartial and independent judicial tribunals, 
but these provisions do not directly apply when determining the 
independence and impartiality required of arbitrators. In that context, 
an arbitration agreement is viewed as an exchange of formal court 
protections for different benefits and protections, and the Federal 
                                                 
 95 Stretford v. Football Ass’n Ltd. [2007] EWCA (Civ) 238 [38] (Eng.). 
 96 Id. [65]. 
 97 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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Arbitration Act was introduced in 1925 to support this.98 In Elmore v. 
Chicago & Illinois Midland Railway Co., for example, the court declared 
“Private arbitration . . . really is private . . . the fact that a private 
arbitrator denies the procedural . . . ‘due process of law’ [safeguards] 
cannot give rise to a constitutional complaint.”99 Indeed one of the 
primary reasons that parties elect to resolve disputes through the 
arbitral process rather than litigation, is due to the fact that it is a 
different process, and it would frustrate this central objective of 
disputing parties to require their chosen process to function in an 
identical way to courts, by applying constitutional protections designed 
for the court process. 100 
VI. ABSENCE OF UNANIMITY 
The rules of arbitration institutions such as the ICC Rules,101 
the AAA Rules,102 the LCIA Rules,103 the WIPO Rules104 and the 
UNCITRAL Rules105 provide that a party can request in writing that 
an arbitrator be disqualified, providing the supporting reasons for the 
request. Some institutional rules also provide that the arbitrator should 
resign if the parties unanimously agree.106 Where there is no consensus, 
the Model Law provides that the arbitral tribunal will determine the 
challenge107 while other arbitration institutions provide that they will 
                                                 
 98 BORN, supra note 1, at 1791–92. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 
1–16. 
 99 782 F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir. 1986). See also BORN, supra note 1, at 1792–93. 
 100 See BORN, supra note 1, at 1793. For an interesting discussion on a unitary 
understanding of public civil dispute resolution, that recognises ADR is often 
energized by state action and consequently constitutionally required to comply with 
minimal but meaningful due process requirements, see Richard C. Reuben, 
Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil 
Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 956 (2000). 
 101 ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 31, at art. 14.1. 
 102 AAA ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 29, at art. 14.1. 
 103 LCIA ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 30, at art. 10.3. 
 104 WIPO ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 32, at art. 25. 
 105 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 28, at arts. 13.1-2. 
 106 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 33, at art. 13.2; AAA ARBITRATION 
RULES, supra note 29, at art. 14.2; LCIA ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 30, at art. 
10.5. 
 107 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 33, atart. 13.2. 
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look into the challenge themselves or provide for a specialised body to 
do so.108 Both the AAA and the American Bar Association’s Code of 
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes provide disclosure 
requirements when acting as an international arbitrator.109 
The application of impartiality and independence standards 
under state law and institutional rules is heavily dependent on the 
specific context of the parties’ arbitration agreement, in particular their 
expectations regarding the arbitrator’s role, and the factual 
circumstances of each case.110 The procedural context can also be 
critical, as objections can be made at any stage from the outset of the 
arbitration, during the course of it or after the arbitration has 
concluded, and different standards will be applied at these various 
stages.111 There are significant differences in approach when the court 
assesses the possibility of removing an arbitrator compared with 
annulment or non-recognition of an award.112 Differing standards of 
independence and impartiality result in different national and 
procedural law requirements applying as a matter of national law, 
depending on the arbitral seat, which is inconsistent with the intentions 
of the New York Convention and the Model Law, which collectively 
promote uniformity in international commercial arbitration.113 This is 
tempered to some degree by ‘autonomous’ standards in institutional 
arbitral rules. However, the standards of “justifiable doubts” and 
“reasonable suspicion” vary regarding the degree of risk or likelihood 
of bias that will be tolerated. While they are objective standards, they 
are merely starting points for analysis. The commercial, legal and 
contractual context within which an arbitrator acts is critical. 114 
                                                 
 108 AAA ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 29, at art. 14.3; LCIA 
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 30, at art. 10.6. 
 109 CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Canon 
II (AAA/A.B.A. 2004). 
 110 BORN, supra note 1, at 1763. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 1775. For an interesting conceptual analysis of impartiality and the 
elucidation of a functional approach that could be applied prescriptively to the 
international arbitration system, see Rogers, supra note 79, at 53–121. 
 114 For example, Rule 13(B) of the American Arbitration Association 
Commercial Rules 2013 allow for “non-neutral arbitrators”. See BORN, supra note 1, 
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While parties have the freedom to choose their arbitrators, 
domestic laws rarely impose specific qualifications in order to act as an 
arbitrator. However, in light of the importance of the task that 
arbitrators must undertake, some minimum qualifications are generally 
imposed by international, institutional and/or national laws. As noted 
above, the legal requirement of impartiality and independence is the 
one most frequently provided for in court instruments, whereas 
neutrality is dealt with in a more subtle, indirect way.115 Despite efforts 
by institutions such as UNCITRAL and the International Bar 
Association to create uniform standards of independence and 
impartiality, there is currently no unanimity on these issues between 
different jurisdictions.116 While the UK Supreme Court recently 
confirmed that an arbitrator must be “independent of the parties” and 
“rise above partisan interests,”117 there is, as discussed, a lack of clear 
and effective standards both domestically and internationally for 
measuring arbitrator performance and this is a cause of concern for 
some time,118 leading one commentator from the U.S. to remark 
almost two decades ago that “barbers and taxidermists are subject to 
far greater regulation than [arbitrators].”119 
                                                 
at 1795–96. For an interesting discussion on whether the parties, the arbitrator or the 
state controls the arbitral process, including an analysis of the concessionary and 
contractualist theories of arbitration, see Yu & Shore, supra note 11, at 935–67. For 
an interesting analysis of party control in arbitration, and the gradual shifting of 
control away from the parties to the tribunal during the process, see generally 
Thomas H. Webster, Party Control in International Arbitration, 19 ARB. INT’L 119 (2003). 
See generally Yeshnah D. Rampall & Ronán Feehily, The Sanctity of Party Autonomy and 
the Powers of Arbitrators to Determine the Applicable Law: The Quest for an Arbitral 
Equilibrium, 23 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 345 (2018). 
 115 See Lee, supra note 20, at 609–10. 
 116 See, e.g., Michael Schafler et al., The Appearance of Justice: Independence and 
Impartiality of Arbitrators under Indian and Canadian Law 5 INDIAN J. ARB. L. 150, 150 
(2017). 
 117 Jivraj v. Hashwani [2011] UKSC 40 [41]. 
 118 In AT&T Corp. v. Saudi Cable Co. [2000] All ER (D) 657 at para. 10, for 
example, the English Court characterised the failure of a Canadian arbitrator to 
disclose his directorship in the company that was a party to the contract in dispute 
as a “most unfortunate secretarial error.” 
 119 Reuben, supra note 100, at 1013. 
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VII. REFORM 
In terms of reform, one must consider national law standards, 
institutional rules, custom and practice, ideological forces, and the 
context and expectations of the parties in individual cases. In many 
instances, arbitrators are selected due to their specialised experience 
and familiarity to the parties and their advisors, and it can be difficult 
for individuals in these circumstances to identify and disclose all 
relationships that could subsequently cause suspicion, or for parties to 
find arbitrators that do have such connections. This was explicitly 
acknowledged by the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals when it 
remarked: 
Familiarity with a discipline often comes at the expense 
of complete impartiality. Some commercial fields are 
quite narrow, and a given expert may be expected to 
have formed strong views on certain topics, published 
articles in the field and so forth. Moreover, specific 
areas tend to breed tightly knit professional 
communities. Key members are known to one another, 
and in fact may work with, or for, one another, from 
time to time.120 
Impartiality standards required of judges cannot be equated 
with the standards expected of international arbitrators, as the 
standards applied to judges are designed for and applied in defined 
comprehensively regulated specific domestic contexts, while standards 
expected of arbitrators are applied in an international context defined 
primarily by the agreement of the parties and their expectations in 
specific cases, reflecting the consensual nature of arbitration.121 The 
fragmented framework of international arbitration depends on more 
                                                 
 120 Morelite Construction Corp. v. New York City District Council Carpenters Funds, 
748 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1984). See also Timmer, supra note 15, at 349–50. 
 121 The Model Law for example, omits any linkage between the impartiality 
of arbitrators and domestic judicial requirements. [UNCITRAL Model Law, supra 
note 33, art. 11]. Similarly, jurisdictions such as Italy, in Article 815 of the Italian 
Code of Civil Procedure and Japan, in Article 18 of the Japanese Arbitration Law, 
have abandoned legislative provisions that linked judicial and arbitral standards of 
impartiality. See BORN, supra note 1, at 1791, for a discussion of this issue. 
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fluid processes for the selection of decision makers and for vetting 
their integrity.122 
However, as discussed above, “arbitral awards are not subject 
to appellate review and arbitrators are not subject to” judicial training 
and discipline. It is consequently quite essential that diligent, good faith 
disclosure is required and the arbitrators are disqualified in cases 
involving real risk of partiality.123 One of the primary sources of 
legitimacy for international arbitration is actual and perceived 
impartiality.124 In this context, standards of impartiality and 
independence must strike the right balance. They must be sufficient to 
ensure the integrity of the arbitral process, but not of an unrealistically 
high nature that they result in compromising the parties’ rights to select 
arbitrators, cause unreasonable delays in the arbitral process, and 
impose substantial costs on the parties.125 Furthermore, “the 
acceptable degree of risk of partiality should vary depending on the 
circumstances of particular cases.”126 As can be seen from the 
discussion above, the formulation of standards on impartiality and 
independence generally seek to be simultaneously generally applicable 
in a wide and varied range of cases and specifically relevant in specific 
cases. While the former has been achieved, attainment of the latter has 
proved more elusive.127 
                                                 
 122 Park, supra note 44, at 482–84. 
 123 BORN, supra note 1, at 1790–91. 
 124 Rogers, supra note 79, at 120. 
 125 See also Timmer, supra note 15, at 350. 
 126 BORN, supra note 1, at 1779. For an interesting discussion on the 
expansion of expectations of arbitrators in international commercial arbitration and 
investment treaty arbitration, and the varied ethical standards and expectations in the 
two distinct fields, see James Crawford, The Ideal Arbitrator: Does One Size Fit All?, 32 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1003, [1003–06] (2017). 
 127 Jurisdictions such as Sweden, in Section 8 of the Swedish Arbitration Act, 
provide guidance that is more specific by identifying specific disqualifying criteria. 
BORN, supra note 1, at 1794. However, such an approach has been criticised for 
failing to take account of changing circumstances and specific contexts. See BORN, 
supra note 1, at 1794. For an analysis of relevant instruments covering impartiality 
and independence standards in investment treaty arbitration and proposals for 
reform, see generally James D. Fry & Juan Ignatio Stampalija, Forged Independence and 
Impartiality: Conflicts of Interest of International Arbitrators in Investment Disputes 30 ARB. 
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An approach that parties could adopt is to provide for a 
heightened impartiality requirement in their agreement requiring, for 
example, that the appointed arbitrators be free from any prior 
connection with, or predisposition towards either of the parties.128 
There is no legislative provision or judicial authority prohibiting this 
approach.129 However, it would be prudent for parties not do adopt an 
overly prescriptive, strict approach in order to avoid disqualifying 
suitably qualified candidates.130 The International Bar Association has 
produced non-binding guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in 
International Commercial Arbitration (“IBA Guidelines”) that appear 
to strike the right balance. Originally published in 2004, they were most 
recently revised in 2014 reflecting clarifications and improvements 
since they were first adopted a decade earlier. The purpose of the IBA 
Guidelines is to harmonise the standards of disclosure and provide 
guidance to best practice with regard to impartiality and independence 
at an international level.131 The IBA Guidelines comprise standards 
together with practical examples of their application, and require more 
demanding standards for disclosure, independence, and impartiality 
than most national laws and institutional rules.132 They are divided into 
two parts; the first part comprises the General Standards Regarding 
Impartiality, Independence and Disclosure, while the second part 
comprises the Practical Application of the General Standards. The 
second part elucidates a non-exhaustive list of circumstances that are 
put into different categories that reflect the colours of traffic lights. 
                                                 
INT’L 189 (2014); Georgios Dimitropoulos, Constructing the Independence of International 
Investment Arbitrators: Past, Present and Future, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371 (2016). 
 128 See Franck, supra note 13, at 502–04. 
 129 See id. The position as to whether the parties can agree to reduced 
standards of independence and impartiality is not as clear, and the validity of such 
agreements is open to question in some jurisdictions. See Section 33(1)(a) of the 
English Arbitration Act 1996 discussed above, that requires arbitrators to act fairly 
and impartially “notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary”. See also BORN, supra 
note 1, at 1814–18. 
 130 It has been suggested that if arbitrators are required to be sanitised from 
all possible external influences on their decisions, only the most naïve or incompetent 
would be available. See Park, supra note 44, at 477. 
 131 BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 7, at 257. 
 132 See BORN, supra note 1, at 1857. See generally David A. Lawson, Impartiality 
and Independence of International Arbitrators – Commentary on the 2004 IBA Guidelines on 
Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, 23 ASA BULL. 22 (2005). 
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First, the Red List is segregated between waivable and non-waivable 
circumstances reflecting situations of serious conflict of interests that 
makes the appointment of the arbitrator impermissible, unless the 
situation is waivable. Second, the Orange List, contains situations that 
the arbitrator must disclose, and third, the Green List comprises 
circumstances that would be unlikely to raise doubts about impartiality 
and independence, and consequently do not require disclosure.133 
The IBA Guidelines assist arbitrators, disputing parties, 
practitioners, arbitral institutions and the courts to determine the issues 
that require disclosure, as they reflect a reasonable balance between 
disclosing everything and disclosing actual or potential conflicts.134 
They have been characterised as innovative in finding new solutions to 
old problems,135 providing a useful universal standard on the disclosure 
requirements of arbitrators by providing a clear framework136 and will 
no doubt continue to benefit from periodic review and revision in light 
of experience gleaned from their adoption and use in various legal and 
cultural contexts.137 The IBA Guidelines could be explicitly 
incorporated into arbitration agreements, which would enhance 
certainty, consistency and predictability and would act as a guide to 
arbitrators, arbitral institutions and the courts. The IBA Guidelines 
have already been adopted by the English courts138 and courts in the 
                                                 
 133 For an overview of the IBA Guidelines, see BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, 
supra note 7, at 256–58. 
 134 MOSES, supra note 6, at 147. 
 135 For an interesting discussion on the original version of the IBA 
Guidelines, see Trakman, supra note 8, at 1020, who in addition to characterizing the 
guidelines as innovative, believes they represent meaningful progress, in particular 
with respect to the pre-existing context. See generally Claudia T. Solomon et al., 
Arbitrator’s disclosure standards: the uncertainty continues, 63 DISP. RES. J. 78 (2008). 
 136 See also Chung, supra note 11, at 175. 
 137 The 2004 version of the IBA Guidelines were subject to criticism, see 
BORN, supra note 1, at 1841–51. As noted above, the 2014 version of the IBA 
Guidelines include clarifications and improvements to address the concerns raised 
since they were first adopted a decade earlier. 
 138 See Sierra Fishing Co. v. Hasan Said Farran [2015] EWHC 140 (Comm); 
[2015] All ER (Comm) 560 (Eng.) at [58] (where the law firm that the arbitrator 
worked in had advised a party on the terms and effect of the arbitration clause, which 
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U.S.,139 are referred to frequently by arbitrators in practice140 and have 
received general acceptance in the international arbitration 
community.141 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
While perfect objectivity may prove elusive, “a reasonable 
measure of arbitrator integrity is both desirable and attainable.”142 The 
required behaviour that parties should expect from arbitrators is 
perhaps best epitomised by reference to the words of former British 
politician and political theorist Edmund Burke, when he remarked of 
parliamentarians “[y]our representative owes you, not his industry 
only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he 
sacrifices it to your opinion.”143 While Burke was effectively cautioning 
that a member of the British parliament is not simply a delegate of his 
electorate, similarly an arbitrator, while appointed by a disputing party 
or parties, has an obligation of good faith to the process and the award. 
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Arbitral integrity demands that arbitrators strike the “optimum balance 
between fairness and efficiency.”144 
The concepts of neutrality, independence and impartiality are 
central to the arbitral process. Even if the delineation between the 
three words cannot easily be established in every case, the requirement 
that arbitrators must be independent, impartial and neutral has the 
common purpose of upholding equal treatment of the parties 
throughout the process.145 As former UK Law Lord Denning famously 
remarked, “Justice must be rooted in confidence, and confidence is 
destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking, ‘that judge was 
biased.’”146 
As the fairness of the process and the outcome that results 
from it depend in large part upon the conduct and the state of mind 
of the appointed arbitrators, parties should expect that an arbitrator 
will be impartial in his or her mind and independent in his or her 
decision making, with the common purpose of upholding equal 
treatment of the parties within a neutral forum. This is ostensibly 
supported by the requirement of good faith from arbitrators, and as 
mentioned previously, the need for their disclosure of any pre-existing 
contact with a party that may give rise to bias or the perception of bias 
throughout the arbitral process. Adherence in arbitration to the central 
themes of neutrality, independence and impartiality is particularly 
important in light of the private and confidential nature147 of the 
arbitral process and the final and binding nature of the award that 
results from that process. The approach proposed above would 
enhance adherence to these distinctive and central themes in 
international commercial arbitration, in order that parties can 
experience a fair process and attain a just outcome. 
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 147 For a discussion on the varied treatment that confidentiality in 
international commercial arbitration has received in different jurisdictions, and 
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